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for the interaction between word meaning 
(e.g., falcon and dolphin) and spatial posi-
tion (high or low) that is reported in several 
studies (Zwaan and Yaxley, 2003; Meier and 
Robinson, 2004; Šetic´ and Domijan, 2007). 
The first explanation is that readers under-
stand concept by perceptual simulation. We 
“hear” the dolphin and see it swimming in 
the ocean. The second explanation for the 
processing advantage between congruency 
of meaning (ocean animal) and position 
(high or low) is that congruency effects 
lie in a response selection process rather 
than in meaning representation (Proctor 
and Cho, 2006). The response selection 
process Pecher et al. (2010) rule out as an 
explanation for the congruency effects (but 
see Lakens, 2011). This leaves only one of 
the two explanations for the congruency 
between word meaning and spatial position: 
perceptual simulations. Since Pecher et al. 
(2010) give no alternative explanations, we 
can infer perceptual simulations to be the 
best explanation for conceptual processing. 
And that is where Lakens (2011) criticism 
becomes relevant: what about linguistic 
processes?
Pecher et al. (2010) attribute the inter-
action between word meaning and spatial 
position solely to perceptual simulations. 
One study that also investigated this interac-
tion, and a study Pecher et al. (2010) refer to, 
is Zwaan and Yaxley (2003). They used word 
pairs such as attic-basement, and presented 
these words in a vertical configuration, attic 
above basement or basement above attic. 
Response times were faster when the word 
pair matched the configuration of their ref-
erents, than when they did not. When the 
word pairs were presented in a horizontal 
configuration the effect disappeared. As 
with Pecher et al. (2010), Zwaan and Yaxley 
(2003) concluded that participants must 
therefore have perceptually simulated the 
meaning of the words.
Louwerse (2008) replicated Zwaan and 
Yaxley’s (2003) findings. In that study two 
predictions were made. First, perceptual 
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Pecher et al. (2010) extended current 
 findings on conceptual processing of words 
denoting references in the sky or in the ocean 
(e.g., falcon, dolphin) presented in differ-
ent positions on the screen (top, bottom). 
This experimental paradigm has shown to 
facilitate processing for word meaning in the 
corresponding spatial location (e.g., falcon 
presented at the top of the screen). Pecher 
et al. (2010) compared two explanations 
for the interaction between concept and 
 position, one related to perceptual simula-
tion, the other to a response selection pro-
cess, in a response time experiments. To test 
the perceptual simulation explanation par-
ticipants received an ocean or sky judgment 
task (“can this item be found in the sky?”, 
“can this item be found in the ocean?”) and 
used a polarity response (yes answer left, yes 
answer right). Polarity correspondence did 
not explain response times and the authors 
concluded that the interaction between ref-
erence–word and position therefore need 
being explained by a perceptual simulation 
account. Lakens (2011) commented on the 
conclusions drawn by Pecher et al. (2010) 
and argued that it is too early to dismiss the 
polarity correspondence principle, a claim 
Van Dantzig and Pecher (2011) responded to.
I would like to take the opportunity to 
respond to another issue that Lakens (2011) 
commented on and one that also played a 
central role in a reply by Van Dantzig and 
Pecher (2011). Lakens pointed out that 
Pecher et al. (2010) explained their find-
ings in terms of perceptual simulations, 
and seemed to dismiss linguistic processes. 
Lakens argued that a unified approach 
including perceptual and linguistic processes 
as an explanation for behavioral data in a 
cognitive task would be more fruitful. Van 
Dantzig and Pecher (2011) aptly pointed out 
that the debate on linguistic and perceptual 
representations was not the central point in 
the article. At the same time, I agree with 
Lakens (2011) that providing an “insight 
into the underlying mental representations 
of meaning” (Pecher et al., 2010, p. 2) and the 
conclusion that “people perform a mental 
simulation of the task-congruent location, 
which directs spatial attention and facili-
tates processing of targets in that location” 
(p. 11) does broader their discussion to the 
importance of perceptual simulations in 
conceptual processing. In fact, Van Dantzig 
and Pecher (2011) agreed with Lakens that 
“it is important to investigate how linguis-
tic processing and mental simulation con-
tribute to language comprehension” (p. 2), 
but “[t]here is, however, no evidence that 
meaning is extracted from linguistic infor-
mation” (p. 2). The question discussed in 
Lakens (2011) and Van Dantzig and Pecher 
(2011) and one that can be inferred from 
Pecher et al. (2010) is whether conceptual 
processing can be explained by perceptual 
simulation and/or by linguistic processes.
The issue whether Pecher et al.’s (2010) 
response times can be explained linguisti-
cally and/or perceptually is not the pivotal 
research of that study. However, I agree with 
Lakens (2011) that it is an important one. 
I have to disagree with Pecher et al. (2010) 
stating: “[t]he ANOVA on RTs showed a 
theoretically uninteresting … interaction 
between category and task, F(1,98) = 73.02, 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.43” (p. 5). In fact, the cat-
egory × task interaction is theoretically very 
interesting given the sheer amount of stud-
ies that investigate different explanations 
for conceptual processing (see Louwerse, 
2011 for an overview). Moreover, the effect 
size of this interaction is by far the highest 
among all effect sizes found in the paper, 
making the interaction also statistically 
interesting.
So what does this interaction between 
category and task involve? If participants 
were told to make an ocean decision, they 
responded faster to ocean words than to sky 
words, with the opposite result for the sky 
decision. Pecher et al. (2010) interpreted 
these findings as evidence for the claim 
that spatial attention is directed by mental 
simulation of the task-relevant conceptual 
dimension. They give two explanations 
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times, the interaction pattern obtained 
for linguistic frequencies maps on to the 
interactions obtained for response times. 
At the very least what these results show 
is that a linguistic factor should not be 
dismissed, or in the case of Pecher et al. 
(2010) ignored. That is, it might be the 
case that by being instructed whether an 
item could be found in the ocean (or in the 
sky) a semantic judgment between ocean–
dolphin and sky–dolphin was made, yield-
ing faster RTs for ocean–dolphin than for 
sky–dolphin. Such a linguistic explanation 
is supported by experimental evidence: 
semantic judgments of linguistic stimuli 
are better explained by statistical linguistic 
frequencies than by perceptual simulation 
ratings (Louwerse, 2008; Louwerse and 
Jeuniaux, 2010).
The statistical linguistic frequencies 
reported here do not demonstrate a statisti-
cal linguistic frequency explanation replaces 
Pecher et al.’s (2010) conclusion that their 
findings indicate perceptual simulations. I 
do not have the response time evidence to 
support such a claim (even though other 
studies have shown that linguistic frequency 
often better explains response times than 
perceptual factors do; Louwerse, 2008). But 
these frequency patterns do suggest that an 
alternative explanation complementary to 
perceptual simulation should not be dis-
missed or overlooked. That is, statistical 
linguistic frequency does not address the 
central polarity alignment question in 
Pecher et al. (2010), but it could explain the 
largest effect size found in their data, putting 
the conclusion that conceptual processing 
is perceptual in nature in a different light.
The potential effects of statistical lin-
guistic frequencies on response times are 
relevant both from an experimental and 
a theoretical perspective. First, from an 
experimental perspective, it is important 
to rule out the possibility that response 
times can also be explained by linguistic 
variables. From this perspective, whether or 
not linguistic processes generated by such 
variables are activated is of less importance. 
At the very least such “confounding” lin-
guistic variables should be ruled out, before 
the conclusion can be drawn that findings 
can be explained by perceptual simulation. 
Knowing that (a) perceptual information is 
encoded in language, (b) patterns  predicted 
from a computational linguistic perspec-
tive match the patterns predicted from a 
whereas the perceptual system picks up on 
more detailed representations and explains 
slower response times best. The Louwerse 
and Jeuniaux (2010) and Louwerse and 
Connell (2011) findings showed that per-
ceptual relations are encoded in language, 
that response times are affected by these lin-
guistic cues, and that the role of linguistic 
and perceptual processes is dependent on 
the conceptual task and the stimuli.
The findings from Louwerse (2008), 
Louwerse and Connell (2011) and Louwerse 
and Jeuniaux (2010) should at the very 
least provide a candidate for a third expla-
nation for Pecher et al. (2010) interaction 
between word meaning and spatial position. 
Language encodes perceptual information, 
a claim Van Dantzig and Pecher (2011) 
agree with (p. 2), and these linguistic cues 
are used in conceptual processing, a claim 
Pecher et al. (2010) overlook but Lakens 
(2011) reminds us of.
Let us consider the findings reported in 
Pecher et al. (2010). The strongest results 
were obtained for the interaction between 
the word meaning (sky words and ocean 
words) and instruction (sky decision and 
ocean decision). The question should there-
fore be raised whether linguistic frequen-
cies could have explained at least some 
of the variance in the response times. For 
instance, because participants were verbally 
instructed to make a judgment on ocean and 
dolphin or ocean and falcon, it is possible 
they could have relied on statistical linguis-
tic frequencies, if ocean–dolphin is more fre-
quent than ocean–falcon.
To test whether the statistical linguis-
tic frequencies matched the perceptual 
simulation explanation (perhaps not a 
surprise given that perceptual relations 
are encoded in language), the log fre-
quency of sky–dolphin and ocean–dolphin 
was computed. The order frequency of 
all of the 160 (2 × 80) word pairs within 
3–5 word grams was obtained using the 
large Web 1T 5-gram corpus (Brants and 
Franz, 2006). The interaction between 
the word sky and ocean and sky–words 
and ocean–words was significant, F(1, 
154) = 39.18, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20. The 
frequencies are presented in Figure 1 
(left), next to the RT results Pecher et al. 
(2010) obtained in the significant interac-
tion, F(1, 98) = 73.02, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.43 
(Figure 1, right). With higher word fre-
quencies generally yielding lower response 
relations are encoded in language. Second, 
these encoded linguistic cues are used by 
comprehenders. Evidence for the first pre-
diction was obtained from the statistical 
linguistic frequencies of the experimental 
word pairs in a 5-gram window. The fre-
quency of higher objects preceding lower 
objects showed to be significantly higher 
than the reverse order. That is, attic more 
frequently precedes basement in language 
than that basement precedes attic. This is 
perhaps no surprise, considering that we 
typically say “up and down,” “high and 
low,” “top and bottom,” “head to toe,” etc., 
rather than that we use the reverse word 
order. Evidence for the second hypothesis 
was obtained when the effect of statisti-
cal linguistic frequencies and participants’ 
iconicity ratings (“how likely is it that item 
x is above item y in the real world”) on 
response times were compared. Both sta-
tistical frequencies and iconicity ratings 
explained response times, but statistical lin-
guistic frequencies outperformed iconicity 
 ratings. Moreover, in a horizontal configu-
ration of the word pairs, statistical linguistic 
frequencies still explained response times 
(but iconicity ratings did not). These find-
ings showed that perceptual relations are 
encoded in language, and that response 
times are affected by these linguistic cues.
Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) extended 
the Louwerse (2008) findings, and again 
showed that linguistic and perceptual fac-
tors both explained conceptual processing. 
However, their relative importance was 
modified by the instructional task and the 
stimuli. If participants were asked to make 
a semantic judgment on word pairs, the 
linguistic factor reigned supreme. If par-
ticipants were asked to make an iconicity 
judgment on pictures, the perceptual factor 
reigns supreme, even though both linguistic 
and the perceptual factors played some role 
in both linguistic and pictorial stimuli, in 
both semantic judgment and iconicity judg-
ment tasks. Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) 
concluded that in shallow processing tasks 
(such as semantic judgments on linguistic 
stimuli) the linguistic system dominates, 
whereas in a deeper processing task (such 
as iconicity judgments on pictorial stimuli) 
the perceptual system dominates. Louwerse 
and Connell (2011) confirmed this conclu-
sion, showing that the linguistic system 
picks up on good-enough representations 
and best explains faster response times best, 
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 continuous grounding of every word in the 
sentence. In other words, grounding of a 
minimal number of words allows compre-
henders to bootstrap meaning throughout 
the statistical linguistic patterns. To make 
this more concrete: if a comprehender 
has heard the sentence “the Ambulocetus 
natans is like a whale” the grounding of 
whale distributes meaning about whales to 
Ambulocetus natans. With some probabil-
ity a comprehender might now categorize 
Ambulocetus natans in oceans, even though 
the Ambulocetus natans might well be a fly-
ing in the sky. Louwerse and Connell (2011) 
showed that this distributed activation 
through statistical linguistic frequencies 
is a good explanation for early conceptual 
processing. Even though the comprehender 
is not entirely clear what an ambulocetus 
natans is, based on the information that it 
has similarities with a whale, it can help 
generating good-enough representations. 
Perceptual information about ambuloce-
tus natans by grounding the word to its 
referent then gives more detailed informa-
tion (for instance, ruling out the possibil-
ity that it can fly). The idea that language 
encodes perceptual information and that 
language users utilize these linguistic cues 
in their comprehension processes is cen-
tral to the Symbol Interdependency Theory 
(Louwerse, 2011). The evidence supporting 
this theory replaces the question whether 
conceptual processing is perceptual with 
the more relevant question whether con-
ceptual processing is dominated more 
by perceptual simulation or by statistical 
 linguistic frequencies – because conceptual 
processing is both linguistic and perceptual.
In conclusion, Pecher et al.’s (2010) 
investigated the interaction between 
words denoting references in the sky or 
in the ocean (e.g., falcon, dolphin), their 
positions on the screen (top, bottom), 
judgment task (“can this item be found 
in the sky?”, “can this item be found in 
the ocean?”) and polarity response (yes 
answer left, yes answer right). Of all the 
main effects and interactions found, the 
interaction between words denoting refer-
ences in the sky or in the ocean (e.g., falcon, 
dolphin) and the judgment task (“can this 
item be found in the sky?”, “can this item 
be found in the ocean?”) by far had the 
largest effect size. A statistical linguistic 
frequency analysis showed similar pat-
terns as a perceptual simulation account, 
providing support for the conclusion that 
conceptual processing is (still) linguistic 
and perceptual.
Together with Lakens (2011) I agree that 
the time is ripe to consider explanations that 
go beyond a strict perceptual simulation 
account. Even though not being the a priori 
research question Pecher et al. (2010) aimed 
to answer, their findings suggest that both 
linguistic and perceptual factors should be 
considered in conceptual processing tasks. 
Indeed, paraphrasing Lakens (2011), a fruit-
ful approach to cognition examines when 
meaning emerges from linguistic and per-
ceptual processes.
 perceptual simulation perspective, make 
a careful analysis including linguistic vari-
ables desirable.
Second, from a theoretical perspective 
it is important to determine how linguis-
tic processing and perceptual simulations 
are involved in cognition. From this per-
spective it is relevant whether or not lin-
guistic processes complement perceptual 
processes in language comprehension. If 
they do not, a number of questions need 
an answer. For instance, why has language 
evolved encoding perceptual relations, 
even though comprehenders do not rely 
on such cues (Christiansen and Chater, 
2008)? Why does the effect of a linguistic 
factor on processing change as a function 
of the conceptual task, if the linguistic vari-
able itself remains constant (Louwerse and 
Jeuniaux, 2010)? And without considering 
linguistic processes, how can the results of 
numerous experiments be explained if ver-
bal processes are not considered (Paivio, 
1986)?
Finally, the question should be raised 
how linguistic processing can lead to 
comprehension (Van Dantzig and Pecher, 
2011). After all, the sentence “whales swim 
in the ocean” make sense because we per-
ceptually simulate the words by ‘seeing’, 
‘hearing’ and ‘feeling’ whales and oceans. 
My argument is not that linguistic pro-
cessing can succeed without any ground-
ing the words of a sentence to perceptual 
information. Instead, the argument is that 
comprehension could emerge without 
Figure 1 | (A) Log frequencies of ocean – (ocean/sky word) and sky – (ocean/sky word). Words are taken from Pecher et al. (2010). (B) Response times in the 
Pecher et al. (2010) study for the interaction between decision task and word category.
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